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Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Pla1:ntiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MAX FLOYD ST'OCKTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8569 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
HOMER F . WILKINSON, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respotulent. 
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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
vs. \ 
) MAX FLOYD STOCKTON, Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8569 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the afternoon of February 4, 1956, at approximately 
6:00 P. M., Max Stockton, Lee Goddard and Dean Carter 
were identified as being in the city of Huntsville, Utah. 
Late in the evening of the same day, at approximately 11:30 
P. M. the three drove in a stolen car from Ogden to Hunts-
ville, and parked in the vicinity of Jesperson's Mercantile. 
In the early morning of February 5, 1956, at approximately 
1:30 A. M., an attempt was made to break into said mer-
cantile, but after breaking off the outside padlock, they 
were unable to cut the lock off the door. Because of this 
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fact, they were forced to abandon their original plan to 
commit larcency therein. They had been observed in their 
attempt and the police and the owner of the mercantile had 
been informed. The owner and his, wife observed a car 
in the vicinity of the mercantile traveling with its lights off, 
and the wife took the license number, which was BY 782. 
This number was radioed to the Weber County Sheriff's 
office and the three were apprehended by Deputy Sheriff 
A. R. Coveio coming down Ogden Canyon. At this time, Lee 
Goddard made a statement to Deputy Coveio out of the 
presence of Appellant Stockton that the three had agreed 
that Goddard and Carter would take the blame because 
of the serious trouble Stockton was already in. 
The Deputy found in the car a suitcase containing 
various burglary tools, a padlock and hasp broken off the 
lock. These were later identified as being the tools used in 
the commission of the crime and the padlock broken off 
the door at Jesperson's Mercantile. 
In the case at hand there appears to be no question as 
to whether there \Vas an attempted burglary committed, for 
Goddard testified as to his guilt and evidence produced by 
the state and the defendant conclusively proves that God-
dard and Carter attempted to burglarize Jesperson's Mer-
cantile. The question this court must resolve is whether 
Max Stockton was just an innocent bystander who went 
along for the ride and had no knowledge of the attempt of 
Goddard and Carter to commit a felonious act. The State 
maintains that the evidence proves that the appellant Stock-
ton did in the night time, aid and abet Goddard and Carter 
in the willful, unlawful, felonious and burglarious act of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
attempting to break and enter Jesperson's Mercantile, lo-
cated in Huntsville, Weber County, Utah, with the intent 
to commit larceny therein. Only the appellant Stockton is 
being tried and charged with this crime, but for the purpose 
of this brief, the state will refer to Lee Goddard and Dean 
Carter as co-defendants and co-conspirators. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE STATE PRODUCED ABUNDANT AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE, AT THE TRIAL 
WHICH SUPPORTS THE VERDICT OF GUIL-
TY OF ATTEMPT TO COMMIT BURGLARY 
IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT· ERR IN ALLOW-
ING DEP·UTY SHERIFF COVElO TO TESTI-
FY AS TO A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE 
DEPUTY SHERIFF AND ONE OF THE CO·-
DEFENDANTS. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW AND IT 
DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTE.D INSTRUCTIONS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE PRODUCED ABUNDANT AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL 
WHICH SUPPORTS THE VERDICT OF GUIL-
TY OF ATTEMPT TO COMMIT BURGLARY 
IN TI-IE SECOND DEGREE. 
The appellant was charged with the violation of Sec-
tions 76-9-3 and 76-1-30, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which 
together set forth the crime of attempt to commit burglary 
in the second degree. The Supreme Court of Utah, in the 
case of State v. Prince, 65 Utah 205, 284 P. 8 said: 
"The three elements which constitute an at-
tempt are: (1) The intent to commit the crime; 
(2) the performance of some overt act towards the 
commission of the crime; ( 3) the failure to consum-
mate its commission." 
The authorities generally agree that mere preparation is not 
sufficient to constitute an attempt. There must be some 
act executed towards the consummation of the crime, how-
ever, this act need not be the last proximate act to the com-
pletion of the offense attempted. The intent must be mani-
fested and it is dependent upon the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case. See 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law. Sec-
tion 75, and cases cited therein. 
Here, the appellant conspired 'vith the co-defendants 
for the perpetration of this crime, so according to well-
known criminal and agency law, he 'vould be liable for the 
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acts of the co-conspirators. The California case of People 
v. Frankfort, 251 P. 2d 401 lays down the general rule and 
is supported by an abundance of authority where it states: 
"Members of a conspiracy are bound by all acts 
of other members done in the furtherance of the 
conspiracy." 
The evidence produced by the state implicates the appellant 
in every phase of this crime and makes him guilty of aiding 
and abetting in the perpetration thereof. 
The state produced a witness who testified, and whose 
testimony was not contradicted, that he saw defendant 
Stockton in the presence of two other people in the city of 
Huntsville on the afternoon of February 4, 1956 (T. 29, 30). 
Ev:idence was set forth by the state that the co-defendant 
Goddard testified at the preliminary trial that defendant 
Stockton helped and advised them as to what car they should 
steal to use when they committed the crime (T. 80, 81). 
The state also brought forth testimony that in the early 
morning of February 5th a car was seen parked in the in-
tersection next to the Jesperson Mercantile with the motor 
running and the lights off, (T. 6, 7) and from such car a 
person could keep a look-out in all four directions (T. 7). 
A person was observed going from the car to the mercantile 
and returning to the car (T. 7). Other testimony was that 
at the preliminary trial co-defendant Goddard testified that 
he went from the mercantile to the car to report that they 
had the lock off the door (T. 81). The state's witness also 
testified that at a later time he noticed the car gone from 
the intersection, but then saw a car with its motor running 
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and the lights off parked one-half block from the mercan-
tile in the same location that defendant stated it was (To 
9) . Other witnesses seeing the car in this location noticed 
the brake light flash on such car and then traveled around 
the block to observe the car, but it had moved (To 9) 0 How-
ever, they followed a car traveling with its lights off and 
took down the license number which was BY 782 (T. 19; 
27). This number was then radioed ahead to the Weber 
County Sheriff's office and the appellant Stockton, with 
Goddard and Carter, was apprehended in Ogden Canyon 
in the car bearing the said license number which was seen 
in the vicinity of Jesperson's mercantile (T. 34, 35). The 
Sheriff found a suitcase of burglary tools and a padlock 
on the front seat of the car and a hasp lying on the floor 
of the back seat (T. 35, 36) o These items were introduced 
as Exhibits A, B, C, and D, and were uncontradicted as 
being the lock taken off the door of Jesperson Mercantile 
and the set of burglary tools used in the commission of the 
crime (T. 42, 43, 61, 65, 66). 
The appellant's evidence was that during the afternoon 
of February 4th the co-defendants Goddard and Carter, 
while preparing to drive to Huntsville for the purpose of 
locating a road out of the valley, (T. 56) just happened to 
see the appellant coming out of a pool hall (T. 51) o They 
asked the appellant to go for a ride, yet they claim there was 
no conversation concerning their purpose of locating an-
other road out of the area (T. 56). That evening, at ap-
proximately 11 :30 P. M. after the co-defendants had stolen 
a car, ( T. 52) just by coincidence they saw appellant stand-
ing on the street corner, and again they asked him to go 
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for a ride and they proceeded to Huntsville, the same city 
they had been to in the afternoon ( T. 53) . There, according 
to their testimony, they parked the· car one-half block from 
Jesperson's :Th1:ercantile, (T. 53) and when the appellant 
asked "where are you going", they sa.id "we'll be back in 
a little while" (T. 54). Co-defendants then left the car, 
taking the suitcase with them and appellant waited for 
them in the car (T. 67, 79). Approximately 15 minutes 
later they returned to the car and after driving around 
Huntsville, started down Ogden Canyon where they were 
taken into custody ( T. 34, 54, 55) . 
Even if appellant remained in the get-away car as a 
look-out, according to the law of conspiracy he would still 
be liable, the same as the co-defendants. This is supported 
by the Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 76-1-44 which 
read's in part as follows : 
"All persons concerned in the commission of a 
crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether they 
directly commit the act constituting the offense· or 
aid and abet in its commission or not being present, 
* * * are principals in any crime so committed." 
The appellant asks us to believe that during this series 
of events he was no naive that he had no knowledge of the 
eo-defendants' intent to commit burglary. The California 
court, in the case of People v. Kross, 112 Cal. App. 2d 602, 
247 P. 2d 44, where there was a conviction of theft on 
circumstantial evidence, said : 
"Whether the evidence is as compatible with 
innocence as with guilt was a question for the jury 
and not for this court ( C,itations) . An appellate 
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court will not review the evidence beyond the point 
of scrutinizing the record to determine whether there 
is substantial evidence that supports the inference 
of guilt. The judgment will not be reversed unless 
it can be said that it is not supported on any reason-
able hypothesis (Citations). * * * Direct proof 
of burglary and theft is not necessary; they may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. * * * It is 
not the law, * * * that each fact in a chain of 
circumstances that will establish a defendant's guilt 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Cita-
tions). The doctrine of reasonable doubt applies to 
proof of guilt and not to the establishment of each 
incident or event inculpating the defendant ( Cita-
tion). A reasonable doubt that would warrant ac-
quittal is one that results or arises from a 'consider-
ation of all the evidence' in the case" (Citations). 
The state set forth evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
that appellant manifested the necessary intent and exe-
cuted an overt act which led towards the consumma-
tion of the crime. The repeated coincidences indicate the 
absurdity of the position of the appellant and the jury at 
the trial court was able to see through it and returned a 
verdict of guilty. 
In the case of People v. Chapin, 303 P. 2d 365, the Cali-
fornia court in regards to cases being revievved, stated: 
"When his appeal is on the ground that the evi-
dence is not sufficient to sustain the finding of the 
jury, the burden is on appellant to demonstrate that 
there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial 
character to support the verdict upon any reasonable 
hypothesis whatever. It is not enough that the es-
tablished facts and circumstances may be reconciled 
with the innocence of the accused. Before a reversal 
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may be had, the facts must disclose no reasonable 
basis for any infe·rence other than appellant's inno-
cence." People v. Hatton, 114 Cal. App. 2d 195, 196, 
249 P. 2d 901, 902. 
The appellant has failed to meet this burden of proof, 
therefore, since the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
conviction, it should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOW-
ING DEPU'TY SHERIFF COVElO TO TESTI-
FY AS TO A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE 
DEPUTY SHERIFF AND ONE OF THE CO-
DEFENDANTS. 
The conversation in question is located on page 83 of 
the transcript beginning with Line 19 and reads as follows: 
"Q. Do you have any recollection with regard 
-did you have a conversation with Lee Goddard 
relative to his stating that they were willing to take 
the blame. 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Will you tell us what the conversation 
was? 
"A. I talked with Lee Goddard about this bur-
glary in Huntsville. 
"Mr. Handy: Just a moment may I voir dire the 
witness your honor. 
"The Court: Yes." 
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Voir dire examination by Mr. Handy: 
"Q. Was this conversation, Officer Covieo in 
the presence· of Mr. Stockton. 
"A. No sir 
"Mr. Handy: I object to it your honor as being 
hearsay." 
Argument 
"The Court: I'll overrule the objection as an 
exception to the rule. You may testify. 
"(To witness) Now do you remember the last 
question? 
"A. Yes, I had a conversation with Lee God-
dard pertaining to Max Stockton. Goddard told me 
just before-well just after I had stopped the car 
at the time he was getting out of the car he stated 
the conversation between Lee Goddard and Dean 
Carter and Max Stockton was, should Lee Goddard 
take the blame along with Dean Carter and leave 
Max Stockton out of it because of the seriousness 
of it and Max Stockton said yes, that he did want 
them to take the blame because of the seriousness 
of the trouble he was already in." 
The above statement of the record' wherein it states: 
* * * "Goddard told me just before-well, just after he 
had stopped the car at the time he was getting out of the 
car, he stated the conversation between Lee Goddard and 
Dean Carter and Max Stockton was", * * * would in-
dicate that the conversation between Goddard and Deputy 
Covieo took place in Ogden Canyon just after the Deputy 
had stopped the car and before the conspirators were put 
under arrest or the conspiracy brought to an end. The dis-
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cussion which Deputy Coveio is testifying to between Stock-
ton, Goddard, and Carter took place at a time when the 
three were alone in the car coming from the scene of the 
crime while they were co-conspirators and before they were 
taken into custody, for the recorded testimony of Officer 
Coveio on pages 85 and 86, is as follows: 
"Q. Did they have that discussion in the pres-
ence of Max? Is that what you are saying? 
"A. The three were together in the car, ye'S 
sir. 
"* * * 
"Q. And at that time Lee Goddard told you 
that they had this discussion about taking the blame, 
Max Stockton was not present was he? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. And any discussion had was prior to your 
stopping the car ; is that right? 
"A. Yes." 
In the case of State v. Simpson, 236 P. 2d 1077, 1079, 
the Utah Supreme Court sets forth a general rule as to 
conversations and declarations of a co-conspirator wherein 
it state·s: 
"It is true that ordinarily the conversations and 
declarations of a co-defendant out of the presence of 
the accused, after the commission o.f the crime would 
not be competent * * * there can be as there 
was here a conspiracy between persons to engage 
jointly in other criminal offenses and if this fact is 
shown by independent evidence the statement of any 
of the conspirators made in furtherance of a com-
mon criminal purpose is unquestionably admissible 
against all. Such conduct in furtherance· of the com-
mon design does not raise the same question as or-
dinary admissions or conversations." 
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The Simpson case continues and quotes from the case 
of People v. Suter, 43 C'al. App. 444, 111 P. 2d 2331, where 
the court said: 
"It has been held that the common design of a 
criminal enterprise may extend in point of time be-
yond the actual commission of the act constituting 
the crime for which the accused is being tried, such 
as for the purpose of concealing the crime, securing 
the proceeds thereof, sharing in or dividing the pro-
ceeds of the crime, or bribing or influencing wit-
nesses, and that consequently, evidence is admissible 
to prove acts committed after * * * the perpe-
tration of the crime for which the accused is on trial. 
Of course, it must reasonably appear that such acts 
were committed in furtherance of the common de-
sign of the conspiracy." 
The State v. Simpson case concludes by quoting from 
State v. Irwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285, where the Utah 
court said: 
"Acts done by the conspirators in order to es-
cape the consequences thereof, even though they at 
that time know that the conspiracy cannot continue, 
are nevertheless acts done in the furtherance of the 
conspiracy." 
This of course indicates that even though the conspir-
acy is at an end and the conspirators are taken into custody, 
any testimony of the conspirators, in order to escape the 
consequences thereof would be admissible. This Court, in 
the case of State v. lr'tvin, supra, wherein there was some 
question as to the admissibility of testimony by officer 
Record who was Chief of the Anti-Vice Squad, that Pierce 
told him that Mayor Irwin had instructed him to make 
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collections from racketeers for allowing them to operate 
in the city. The court held: 
"Thus the testimony by Record of his conversa-
tion with Pierce was admissible in evidence against 
all of the defendants, not for the purpose of proving 
agency, this was proved by other evidence, but as a 
circumstance proving the conspiracy. This conver-
sation was in furtherance of the conspiracy. * * * 
This testimony was therefore clearly admissible." 
In the Oklahoma case of Parnell v. State, 250 P. 2nd 
47 4, the co-conspirator Lee was transporting intoxicating 
liquors from without the state into the state of Oklahoma 
without a permit from the tax commission. At the time of 
his arrest he 1nade certain admissions to the arresting sher-
iff implicating the other conspirator, Parnell. It is con-
tended that when the court allowed the sheriff to testify 
to the statement made by Lee at the time of his arrest, it 
committed reversible error because such testimony was 
hearsay. The court reiterated the general rule that the 
arrest of the co-conspirator precludes any further concerted 
action and ordinarily puts an end to conspiracy. Therefore, 
any statement by the co-conspirator out of the presence of 
the other conspirator would be hearsay and inadmissible. 
However, the court held that the facts and evidence show 
that the conspiracy had not been abandoned with the arrest 
of Lee; that the conspiracy was. still in effect and there-
fore the statement by Lee to the sheriff was admissible 
against both the conspirators even though not made in the 
presence of Parnell. The court said: 
"And until this conspiracy was accomplished or 
abandoned, the declarations of either Parnell or Lee 
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in connection with the conspiracy would be admis-
sible against the other man, even though made in 
the absence of the other conspirator." 
The Parnell case, in quoting from Barnes v. State, 8 
Okla. C. R. 554, 129 P. 657, states: 
"The responsibility of co-conspirators for the 
language or conduct of those acting with them is 
not confined to the accomplishment of the common 
purpose for which the conspiracy was entered into, 
but extends to and includes all declarations made and 
collateral acts done incident to and growing out of 
the common design and spoken or done by a co-con-
spirator as against all of his co-conspirators." 
From the above discussion of cases it appears that in 
order to introduce testimony of a co-conspirator, you must 
first show other evidence tending to prove a conspiracy 
and, second, that the conspiracy was not ended at the time 
the statement was made. Mr. Justice Wade, speaking for 
this court in the case of State v. Irwin, supra, quoted the 
following Utah statute found in the Utah Code Annotated 
1953, Section 77-31-18: 
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony 
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other 
evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the 
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the 
defendant with the con1mission of the offense; and 
the corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely 
shows the commission of the offense or the circum-
stances thereof." 
The court continues and states: 
"This court has held this corroboration need 
not go to all the material facts testified to by the 
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accomplice (State v. Stewart, 57 Utah 224, 193 P. 
855) ; that the corroborative evidence need not be 
sufficient in itself to support a conviction; it may 
be slight and entitled to little consideration. People 
v. Lee, 2 Utah 441; State v. Spencer, 15 Utah 149, 
49 p. 302. * * * 
"On the other hand, the corroborating evidence 
must implicate the defendant in the offense and be 
consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his 
innocence, and must do more than cast a grave sus-
picion on him, and all of this must be without the 
aid of the testimony of the accomplice. * * * 
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P. 972; and State v. 
Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P. 2d 51." 
The above was upheld by Mr. Justice Crockett in the case of 
State v. Simpson, supra. 
The appellant in his brief on pages 12 and 13, states 
the following : 
"The Utah case of State v. Simpson, 236 Pac. 
2nd 1077, 1078, in regard to a conversation of a co-
defendant out of the presence of the defendant had 
this to say: 
" 'There can be as there was here, a con-
spira~y between persons to engage jointly in 
other criminal offenses and if this fact is shown 
by independent evidence, the statements of any 
of the conspirators, made in furtherance of the 
common criminal purpose is unquestionably ad-
missable against all.' 
"According to the above Utah case there must 
be independent evidence of other criminal offenses, 
and only if the statements were made in furtherance 
of the common criminal purpose are the statements 
admissable." (Emphasis by Appellant.) 
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Here, the appellant, by his own admission, admits that the 
conversation would be admissable if it complied with the 
requirements of producing independent evidence of the 
criminal offense and if the statement was in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. The state according to the evidence as set 
forth in Point I of this brief, has certainly complied with 
the requirements set down in State v. Irwin, supra, and 
State v. Sitnpson, supra, in regards to proving evidence 
tending to show a conspiracy or the corpus delicti. The 
conspiracy was not at an end when the statement was 
made, for the defendants had not yet been placed under 
arrest and even if they had been, according to State v. Simp-
son, supra, an act to escape the consequences of a conspir-
acy is still part of the conspiracy. The purpose of the con-
versation between the three conspirators was to avoid the 
consequences of the conspiracy for Stockton. Therefore, 
this "vould meet the requirement that the conspiracy must 
still be in force. The state has met this burden of proof and 
thus the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of 
Deputy Coveio. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW AND IT 
DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
The state maintains that the Court's instructions num-
bered 1 to 22 covered the Ia \V as it applies to the facts of 
this case. The appellant's requested instructions numbered 
1 to 6 'vere adequately and thoroughly covered within the 
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Court's instructions. The appellant, on pages 14 to 17 of 
his brief, states his requested instructions, so for the pur-
pose of this argument, they will be referred to by number 
and will not be restated. 
In the requested instructions 1, 5 and 6, the appellant 
tends to invade the jury's domain of being sole judge of 
determining the credibility of the witnesses, of the weight 
of evidence, and of all questions of fact. The Supreme 
Court of Utah, in the case of State v. Fertig, 233 P. 347, 
349, states : 
"* * * If the facts themselves are in dispute 
as to whether the· witness would or did not do the 
things which if he did do them, would make him an 
accomplice, then it is for the jury to determine 
whether he is in fact an accomplice or not. State 
v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 205." 
According to the case of State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 
540, 70 P. 2d 458, an accomplice is as guilty as the princi-
pal, for it states: 
"In this state we have no statutory definition 
of an accomplice, but the court has construed the 
word to refer to one who is or could be charged as 
a principal with the defendant on trial." 
Therefore, even if the jury found appellant Stockton was an 
accomplice, in accordance with appellant's. requested in-
struction, he would still be guilty of the crime charged. 
The court's instructions numbered 10, 12, 13, 16, 17 
and 20 generally cover the law as requested by the appellant 
in his above three requested instructions. 
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Requested instructions numbered 2 and 3 are specifi-
cally covered by the court's instruction No. 11. 
Appellant, in his requested instruction No. 4 infers 
that there was a voluntary abandonment of the criminal 
intent, therefore there was no crime of attempt to commit 
burglary. The facts prove that no such issue was raised, 
for the padlock was broken off and an attempt was made to 
cut the lock off the door, as well as to pry the back door 
open. The final act to the consummation of the crime was 
put into execution, but due to their inability to complete 
their purpose, they were forced to abandon it from necessity 
rather than voluntarily. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant was convicted of the offense charged 
in a fair and impartial trial by a jury who saw and heard 
the witnesses and were able to determine the accuracy and 
credibility of the evidence that was produced. The evidence, 
even without the testimony of Deputy Coveio was sufficient 
to ,convince a reasonable man beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the guilt of this. man. Deputy Coveio's testimony as to the 
furtherance of the cons.piracy by attempting to avoid the 
consequences of their act substantiated and corroborated 
the evidence and the guilt of Max Stockton. The court prop-
erly instructed the jury as to the law that applies. to this 
case, therefore, the judgment of the· lower court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. C:ALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
HOMER F. WILKINSON, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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